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INTRODUCTION
The developing litigation finance industry is applauded by those
who champion its access-granting and bargaining-power-equalizing
functions for low-income plaintiffs in civil suits, and derided by those
who warn of its unsavory business practices and interference with settlement efforts. With no current body of law adequately addressing
the potential problems this burgeoning industry creates, it is vital to
develop an approach to litigation finance that protects both the integrity of the settlement process and consumer interests. Such an approach simultaneously must avoid excessive regulation that effectively
hinders court access by precluding disadvantaged plaintiffs with viable
claims from having their days in court. Applying systems thinking to
the field of litigation finance and its effect on settlement reveals a
simple objective that would best achieve the necessary balance between this new field’s angels and demons: reducing the time delay
currently plaguing civil courts.
Part I of this Comment explores the general structure, history,
and current status of litigation finance, identifying the circumstances
that stimulated its creation and describing its prototypical operation.
Part I also briefly reviews existing legal doctrines that have been, or
could potentially be, used to regulate litigation finance, including
champerty, usury, and contract law. Part II examines the widely diverging viewpoints about the litigation finance industry, focusing in
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particular on the industry’s effect on settlement. Ultimately, Part II
concludes that, despite the positive aspects of litigation finance—
particularly, increased court access and bargaining power—a modicum of reform is nonetheless necessary to alleviate its negative aspects,
which include dubious ethical practices, consumer exploitation, and
arguable encouragement of frivolous litigation.
Finally, Part III provides an explanation of the general principles
of systems thinking, posits that systems thinking is the best way to approach any attempt to regulate the litigation finance industry, and argues that the best method of regulation is for courts to work to reduce
the time between when a claim is brought and when it is terminated
by either settlement or trial. A reduction in time delay would curtail
the negative effects of litigation finance by limiting the number of
plaintiffs who require such financial assistance, the sum required by
those plaintiffs who do need assistance, and the accumulation of interest on the principal amount advanced. The industry would nevertheless be able to continue to provide its service to those plaintiffs
most in need.
I. THE LITIGATION FINANCE INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
A. History and Structure
Litigation financing, the provision of cash advances to plaintiffs
1
prior to the resolution of their claims, has evolved from a virtually
unknown and relatively isolated practice to a veritable and thriving
2
industry. The litigation finance industry owes its development to a
convergence of factors that left fertile soil for its explosive growth. Astounding technological and informational innovations and their ensuing availability to the masses—particularly the ability to use the Inter1

See Terry Carter, Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Financial Strains on
Plaintiffs Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2004, at 34, 34 (describing litigation financing, or “presettlement funding,” as the business of giving cash advances to plaintiffs “before trial or
settlement”). There are several variations on litigation financing. For example, some
companies aggregate the claims they acquire and sell shares of the composite funds.
Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 798 (2004). In addition, some litigation financiers provide
cash advances to plaintiffs’ attorneys. Carter, supra, at 34. For the purposes of this
Comment, though, the phrase “litigation financing” will mean a direct cash-advance
arrangement between a litigation finance company and a plaintiff in a civil action.
2
See Kirk Hansen, New Schemes Target Potential Settlements, CLAIMS MAG., Nov. 2003,
at 48, 48 (noting that, as of the article’s publication, there were more than one hundred litigation finance businesses).
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net to establish a business and the accompanying proliferation of
methods allowing for more, faster, and cheaper communication with
potential customers—certainly comprise one such factor, as they re3
moved previously existing barriers to entering the marketplace. Sky4
rocketing litigation costs, combined with both the prohibition on at5
torneys advancing living expenses to their clients and the refusal of
traditional lenders to recognize pending litigation as an asset when
determining qualification for borrowing, left an increasing number of
6
plaintiffs financially unable to pursue their claims. Finally, a significant deterioration of laws against champerty—the acquisition of financial interest in a legal claim by a third party—removed any immediate fear of liability that may otherwise have prevented entrepreneurs
7
from embarking upon the business of litigation finance.
The self-proclaimed father of the modern litigation finance industry is former “rock musician and mobile-home park developer” Perry
8
Walton. Walton was convicted of extortionate collection of debt in
1997 and then turned to litigation finance for his new career, conducting instructional seminars on how to successfully get started in

3

See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance
Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 56 (2004) (remarking
upon the role of technology in the creation of the litigation finance industry); see also
Hansen, supra note 2, at 48 (describing a now-defunct website, modeled after eBay,
that operated as an online marketplace for unsettled claims).
4
See Donald L. Abraham, Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal To Remove Two Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1992)
(dividing fiscal burdens on plaintiffs into access fees, such as filing fees, and equipage
costs, such as attorney and expert witness fees, and noting that, while access fees have
declined, “significant equipage barriers remain”).
5
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2003) (forbidding attorneys
from providing financial assistance beyond litigation costs to clients). For an argument that such rules should be changed to allow attorneys to offer financial support to
their clients, see James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition
of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223,
246-47 (2003).
6
See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56
MERCER L. REV. 649, 650 (2005) (“[M]ost traditional lenders are unwilling to lend
money with only a potential litigation recovery as collateral because such loans are
deemed to be too risky.”).
7
See Adam Liptak, Lenders to Those Who Sue Are Challenged on Rates: In Ohio Case,
Court Says Fees Are Too High, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at A15 (“[A]n erosion of the prohibition on investing in others’ lawsuits, or champerty, has helped create the industry.”). For a definition of champerty and assessment of its current application, see infra Part I.C.1.
8
Richard B. Schmitt, Staking Claims: A Las Vegas Lender Tests Odds in Court—And
Forms an Industry, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2000, at A1.
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9

the business as well as managing a firm of his own. Litigation financing is a recent innovation, with its seeds sowed “on a small scale little
more than a decade ago with cash advances to individual plaintiffs
10
needing money to keep their lives or their lawsuits going.” Since its
inception, the field has grown considerably, garnering attention from
the bench, the bar, and external analysts alike.
The litigation finance process typically begins when a plaintiff is
referred to a litigation finance company by her attorney; however,
such businesses frequently employ advertising techniques that facili11
tate direct contact from potential clients as well.
After a plaintiff
seeking funding submits an application to a particular company, an
employee (only in some instances an attorney) solicits information
about and reviews the applicant’s legal claim to determine whether or
not the application will be accepted and a financing contract subse12
quently executed. Described as promoting a “new twist on legalized
13
gambling,” litigation financiers offer nonrecourse funding—if the
plaintiff ultimately loses her case at trial she has no obligation to repay

9

See Martin, supra note 3, at 70 (quoting Walton as asserting that “‘[p]retty much
everybody who got their start in the industry got it from me’”); Schmitt, supra note 8, at
A1 (describing Walton’s nefarious entrance into litigation funding and the uncertain
legality of his actions). Walton has since faced legal troubles in his new career as well:
he and his Future Settlement Funding Corporation were held liable for wrongful interference with a contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices by a North Carolina
jury. Gary Young, Two Setbacks for Lawsuit Financing: But the Practice Is Still Alive, N.J.
L.J., Aug. 18, 2003, at 21. Stories such as this lend support to the arguments of those
who condemn the litigation finance industry as inherently disreputable. See infra Part
II.B for a further discussion of these viewpoints.
10
Carter, supra note 1, at 34.
11
See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 799 (characterizing the litigation finance claim-acquisition process as including both attorney referrals and advertisements on websites and in professional journals); Am. Legal Fin. Ass’n, FAQs,
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/alfasite2/faqs.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) [hereinafter ALFA FAQs] (“ALFA receives much of its business from attorney referrals.”).
12
See ALFA FAQs, supra note 11 (“Each ALFA member employs legal analysts or
attorneys who review the pending case of each applicant by examining legal documents and speaking with the client’s attorney. Only those plaintiffs with meritorious
cases and a good likelihood of success become eligible for advance funding support.”);
infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing how this process may create ethical concerns relating to confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege).
13
Elizabeth Sniegocki, The Advanced Litigation Funding Industry: Gambling on Justice?, FLA. UNDERWRITER, May 2003, at 29, 29.
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the amount advanced, and the company thus forfeits its entire invest14
ment.
The procedure following a plaintiff’s successful resolution of her
claim, be it through settlement or at trial, varies according to the
structure of the agreement, which can fluctuate across the industry.
Some lenders take a flat fee based on a percentage of the plaintiff’s
15
recovery, but most charge interest rates that can be up to 15%
16
monthly and can approach 200% annually when compounded.
These extraordinarily high rates are often justified by those in the litigation finance industry as necessary to compensate for the significant
17
risk they assume by advancing money on a nonrecourse basis.
In order to combat negative attention accorded the litigation finance industry due to such high rates, and spurred by an investigation
18
into the industry by then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer —
who later reached an agreement with nine litigation finance organiza19
tions to institute certain reforms —the American Litigation Finance
20
Association (ALFA) was formed in March 2005. The first national
trade association in the field of litigation finance, ALFA was formed by
eleven member companies that agreed upon joining to abide by “best
21
practices.” Its creation represented a significant step by the indus-

14

See Eileen Libby, Whose Lawsuit Is It?: Ethics Opinions Express Mixed Attitudes About
Litigation Funding Arrangements, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 36, 36 (explaining the basic
structure of nonrecourse funding).
15
Sniegocki, supra note 13, at 30.
16
Carter, supra note 1, at 34.
17
See Martin, supra note 3, at 66 (characterizing the justification for higher interest rates as compensation for excessive risk); ALFA FAQs, supra note 11 (responding to
a question about the high rates charged on advances against lawsuits by citing the
greater amount of risk involved in addition to high transaction costs). For information
on the debate over how much risk is actually involved in these transactions, see infra
note 85.
18
See Dee McAree, Legal Cash-Advance Businesses Form Group, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 28,
2005, at 4 (describing the causes behind ALFA’s formation).
19
See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Personal Injury Cash
Advance Firms Agree to Reforms (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2005/feb/feb28a_05.html (listing reforms agreed to by participating companies,
including “[c]lear and conspicuous disclosure statements,” a “five-business-day right
to cancel the contract without obligation or penalty,” and a “notarized acknowledgment by the consumer’s attorney that the contract has been reviewed and explained to
the client,” among others).
20
See McAree, supra note 18, at 4 (reporting on the formation of ALFA).
21
Id.
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try—symbolically if not substantively—to self-regulate and improve its
22
public image.
A young field that, until recently, existed relatively unnoticed, litigation finance has fallen under continuously increasing scrutiny and
has incited debate over its virtues and vices and, accordingly, over how
23
(or whether) it should be regulated.
B. Current Status: In Legal Limbo
This debate is further complicated by the states’ disparate treatment of litigation finance, by an uncertainty concerning which existing legal doctrines are applicable, and by a general lack of modern
24
law directly addressing the industry or analogous enterprises.
In
Florida, litigation finance cleared its first appellate level hurdle when
a court reluctantly upheld the deal being challenged, reasoning that it
25
did not have the authority to void the deal under state law. However, the court, recognizing the potential risks created by financial
participation in litigation by parties otherwise extrinsic to the suit,
26
suggested legislative intervention.
Similarly, a New York court expressed frustration at being left no choice but to enforce a litigation
finance contract due to the fact that “under New York law [litigation
finance arrangements] are allowed as long as the primary purpose
and intent of the assignment was for some reason other than bringing
22

See id. (characterizing the member companies’ purpose of forming ALFA as “an
attempt to raise standards and improve [the litigation finance industry’s] image”). For
other examples of the industry’s attempts to improve its reputation, see Martin, supra
note 3, at 73 (“Litigation finance firms . . . are making attempts to institutionalize their
industry, to improve their image by being more forthcoming on the rates they are
charging, to keep those rates closer to credit card rates, and to become more involved
in their communities.”); Cristina Merrill, Judgment Call: Firms That Lend to PersonalInjury Plaintiffs Take Steps To Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27,
2003, at 1 (describing support of the industry by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, an “advocacy group for low-income New Yorkers”).
23
See infra Part II for a detailed analysis of the debate over the positive and negative effects of the litigation finance industry, and see infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text for a description of various proposals advanced for the industry’s regulation.
24
See infra Part I.C for a review of these various doctrines and their application in
certain states.
25
See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(upholding agreement between plaintiff and litigation finance company due to a lack
of Florida law regulating such agreements).
26
See id. at 630 (“This court has no authority to regulate these agreements. However, if the Florida Bar is going to allow lawyers to promote and provide such agreements to their clients . . . the legislature might wish to examine this industry to determine whether Florida’s citizens are in need of any statutory protection.”).
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27

suit on that assignment.” The court thus called for action by the state’s
28
Attorney General.
Courts in other states have approached litigation finance with
greater hostility. In North Carolina, a federal court awarded more
than $500,000 to a law firm claiming that a litigation finance company
interfered with the attorney-client relationship in one of the firm’s
29
cases. In that case, two litigation finance companies and five individuals (including the aforementioned Perry Walton) were found liable for “wrongful interference with a contract and for unfair and de30
ceptive trade practices.”
In Ohio, a surprising and oft-criticized
decision declared litigation finance arrangements to be champertous
31
and thus void under Ohio law.
The ethical ramifications of litigation financing are similarly ambiguous, and vary state by state. Ethics opinions issued in Arizona,
Florida, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia reflect
32
the generally uncertain ethical status of litigation finance.
These
opinions alternately declare that litigation finance contracts violate
the prohibition of fee splitting among attorneys and nonattorneys,
permit attorneys to provide litigation finance companies with information about a client’s case with the client’s consent, and enigmatically allow an attorney to offer a client information about litigation fi33
nancing companies only when doing so is “in the client’s interests.”

27

Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (emphasis added).
28
Id. at *8 (“If the Attorney General was to formally legalize these arrangements
by an ‘opinion letter’ rather than merely allow them to operate pursuant to an
‘agreement’ . . . that would be appreciated by the court.”).
29
Young, supra note 9, at 21.
30
Id. at 22.
31
See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio
2003) (holding contracts “making the repayment of funds advanced to a party to a
pending case contingent upon the outcome of that case” void as champerty and maintenance); infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of the
doctrine of champerty). For a criticism of the court’s decision in Rancman, see Richmond, supra note 6, at 658-60.
32
See Libby, supra note 14, at 36 (providing an overview of how various state ethics
committees have addressed litigation financing). For further discussion of the ethical
implications of litigation finance, see infra Part II.B.
33
Libby, supra note 14, at 36.
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C. Related Legal Doctrines
Several areas of the law currently are, or could potentially be, applied to the litigation finance industry—in particular, champerty prohibitions, usury statutes, and certain elements of contract law. Upon
closer examination, however, it is evident that these laws materially
predate contemporary business and legal practices, and are, therefore,
less than ideal frameworks with which to analyze litigation finance.
1. Champerty
The doctrine of champerty, which forbids “the sale of the fruit of
legal judgment or settlement, in advance of such judgment or settle34
ment, to an otherwise disinterested party,” has deeply embedded his35
torical roots, dating back to ancient Greece and Rome. The ancient
doctrine developed during the rise of Christianity, in part to categori36
cally deter even meritorious litigation. The doctrine of champerty
continued to gain strength, and was incorporated into the common
37
law during the Renaissance in opposition to the rise of capitalism.
Today, the cited policies justifying champerty prohibitions include
discouraging frivolous litigation, diminishing resistance to settlement,
reducing interference with the attorney-client relationship, and pre38
venting “strife, discord, and harassment.” In Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., a recent decision reviving the dormant prohibition of champerty in Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme Court eloquently
and enthusiastically described the doctrine’s purpose as preventing
“‘officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by
vexatious and speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of

34

Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2002) (emphasis omitted). For a useful survey of state
champerty laws, see id. at 1333-41.
35
See Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543
(1996) (detailing the historical origins of champerty).
36
Id. at 1544 (linking the general goal of discouraging litigation to the rise of
Christianity and its accompanying encouragement of debt forgiveness).
37
Id. at 1543.
38
Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005); see Martin, supra note 3, at 57 (delineating various justifications offered in support of champerty prohibitions); Dobner, supra note 35, at 1546
(same).
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society, lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of
39
the law.’”
States diverge wildly in their definitions of and approaches to
40
champerty. Some continue to recognize (or have resuscitated) the
41
42
doctrine, citing the policies mentioned above as support.
Conversely, others have eliminated the prohibition and therefore enforce
43
champertous agreements, arguing that the champerty doctrine is in44
applicable to modern business and that other principles of law can
45
more effectively achieve the doctrine’s goals.
Many regard champerty prohibitions as fossils—relics of an earlier age for which there
46
truly are no contemporary justifications.
The inconsistency of its form, substance, and application among
states; its lack of relevance to modern business transactions; and the
potential for its purposes to be served in other ways render the doc39

789 N.E.2d 217, 219-20 (Ohio 2003) (quoting 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 3 (1991)).
40
See Bond, supra note 34, at 1333-41 (surveying champerty laws in the fifty states);
cf. id. at 1304 (“[C]onfusion reigns over what the doctrine of champerty is and to
whom it applies.”). Note that contingent fee arrangements are exceptions to the prohibition of champerty. Historically, champertors were attorneys. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d
at 220. These practices are now regulated by MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.8(i).
41
See, e.g., Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he doctrine
[of champerty] continues to have vitality in this State.”); Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220
(acknowledging that while the doctrine of champerty has “in recent years . . . lain
dormant in Ohio courts,” it is nevertheless still a part of the common law); id. at 221
(holding a contract void as champerty).
42
See, e.g., Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220-21 (describing the disincentives to settlement and tendencies to prolong litigation created by champertous agreements); id. at
221 (“An intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation.”).
43
See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997) (“We rule that the
common law doctrines of champerty, barratry, and maintenance no longer shall be
recognized in Massachusetts.”); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277
(S.C. 2000) (abolishing champerty as a defense in South Carolina); Martin, supra note
3, at 57 (“New Jersey has always permitted and enforced champertous agreements.”);
cf. id. at 58 (commenting that “other common law countries have increasingly been
relaxing prohibitions on champerty”).
44
See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“Champerty law was not written to deal with the situation
that has developed from this modern form of business . . . .”).
45
See Richmond, supra note 6, at 653 (“‘[O]ther well-developed principles of law
can more effectively accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless lawsuits and the filing of frivolous suits’ than can these dated doctrines.” (quoting Osprey,
Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 277)).
46
See, e.g., Dobner, supra note 35, at 1545 (discussing changes that render “[t]he
contemporary justification for laws against champerty and maintenance . . . far from
obvious”).
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trine of champerty in its current incarnation an unpromising vehicle
47
for regulation of the litigation finance industry.
2. Usury
Usury laws, which prohibit lending money at an unlawfully high
48
interest rate, are akin to champerty prohibitions in their historical
significance. The first recorded version of a usury statute can be
49
found in the 1750 B.C.E. Code of Hammurabi. Enacted to “protect
50
vulnerable borrowers from predatory or unscrupulous lenders,”
usury laws have been criticized for their paternalism and for the im51
pediment they pose to people seeking to borrow money, as well as
52
for their economic illogic.
Although at first glance usury regulations appear to render most
53
litigation finance contracts illegal, the law in most states likely considers such contracts to be investments rather than loans due to their
contingent nature, and litigation finance companies are therefore ex54
empt from compliance with statutory limits on interest rates. While
47

In addition, some commentators note that refusing to enforce litigation finance
contracts by invoking champerty prohibitions would result in a windfall for the plaintiff, who, without the contract, would presumably not have been able to pursue her
case in the first place. See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 812.
48
See George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Industry: Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 753, 765
n.102 (2003) (“Regulations that specify a maximum rate of interest that an institution
can charge for lending money are known as usury laws.”); id. at 765 (noting that the
term “usury” often is associated with “any level of interest felt to be unjust and unfair”).
49
See Martin, supra note 3, at 58 (describing the historical background of usury
laws).
50
Richmond, supra note 6, at 665.
51
See Swan, supra note 48, at 778 (describing one rationale of usury law as preventing “poor persons . . . from so overindulging themselves in debt”); id. at 768 (observing
the irony that, while the purpose of usury law is to protect risky borrowers, “it is precisely these borrowers who are most hurt by usury laws,” in that “they are deprived of
all credit facilities”).
52
See id. at 778 (“Consistent with economic logic is the welcome of the litigation
funding industry into a state’s marketplace.”); id. at 768 (noting that usury laws “create
an artificial ‘shortage’ of credit” that results in a contrived and economically inefficient meting out of credit); id. at 769 (“On its face, usury law . . . is economically illogical.”).
53
See supra note 16 and accompanying text (estimating the extremely high interest
rates charged by litigation finance companies).
54
See Martin, supra note 3, at 58-59 (generalizing that most states include an absolute obligation for the borrower to repay as a necessary element of usury); Sniegocki,
supra note 13, at 30 (“The critical distinction is the contingent nature of the transaction.”). The Rancman court explicitly avoided deciding whether the contract in ques-
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this theory has not yet been directly tested in court, under such an
analysis, usury laws in their current form are simply inapplicable to
nonrecourse funding arrangements.
3. Contract
Traditional common law contract defenses such as duress and unconscionability could potentially be employed to make contracts between litigation finance companies and plaintiffs in civil suits ineffec55
tive in situations where the courts deem such relief appropriate.
However, due to the rather strict requirements for satisfying such doc56
trines, few courts have applied them to litigation finance as of yet.
II. DIVERGENT OPINIONS ABOUT LITIGATION FINANCE
57

The recent expansion of the litigation finance industry and the
58
uncertainty surrounding the legal environment in which it exists
have prompted an extensive dialogue about the industry’s value.
Supporters praise the litigation finance industry for performing a
necessary service by enabling those who might otherwise be excluded
from the judicial process to pursue their days in court; detractors disparage the industry for taking advantage of consumers and operating

tion was a loan and thus subject to usury laws by voiding it on champerty grounds.
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 2003) (“It
is unnecessary for the resolution of this case to determine the threshold level of risk
necessary for a contingent advance to be treated as an investment rather than a loan.
The advances here are void as champerty and maintenance regardless of whether they
are loans or investments.”). But see Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002,
2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“[I]t is ludicrous to consider this
transaction anything else but a loan.”).
55
See Bond, supra note 34, at 1307-08 (discussing how such doctrines have been
used to accomplish the same policy goals as the prohibition of champerty).
56
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”) (emphasis
added); id. § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 208
cmt. d (“A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal
in bargaining position . . . . Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscionability . . . include . . . knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable
reasonably to protect his interests.”).
57
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (identifying dramatic growth in litigation finance).
58
See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (depicting the unresolved legality
of the industry).
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in an ethical no-man’s land; and participants on both sides of the debate cite the industry’s effect on settlement efforts as support for their
respective positions.
A. Proponents
Supporters of litigation finance argue that the industry performs
an equalizing function by allotting plaintiffs the resources necessary to
see their claims through to resolution and increase their credibility in
pretrial negotiations. This is a relevant concern, since a plaintiff experiencing financial pressure has an incentive to accept a less-thanreasonable settlement offer and may even have to abandon her case.
While a contingent fee arrangement—whereby the attorney’s fee is
only paid out of any judgment or settlement obtained—can relieve
the plaintiff of the up-front cost of obtaining legal representation, she
will still need the means to satisfy everyday expenses (and medical
59
bills, if injured) while her claim pends. As support for this position,
ALFA states that when “money quickly becomes tight and victims find
it difficult to pay bills, purchase food and basic supplies, or keep their
homes,” litigation finance “gives them the means they need to keep
their families and lives intact while they await a complete and fair reso60
lution of their case.” Litigation finance is thus analogized to other
forms of subprime lending, which “provide[] opportunities for lowincome borrowers to buy homes, cars and other goods by obtaining
61
credit that is unavailable to them in the prime market.” A plaintiff
unable to meet her financial needs by obtaining such “credit”—in this

59

See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(“Grocery stores and home mortgage lenders do not wait for payment merely because
a person is unable to work due to an automobile accident or other injury.”); Abraham,
supra note 4, at 1301 (“Even with [a contingent fee] arrangement . . . potential plaintiffs are sometimes excluded due to the fact that an attorney who takes a lawsuit on a
contingency fee basis does not ensure that sufficient funds will be available to carry the
plaintiff’s claim to court.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 649-50 (recognizing that while
the contingent fee system “address[es] attorney compensation issues,” it does not “help
a plaintiff with the costs of daily living”).
60
ALFA FAQs, supra note 11.
61
Martin, supra note 3, at 66; see also Richmond, supra note 6, at 650 (acknowledging that “most traditional lenders are unwilling to lend money with only a potential
litigation recovery as collateral because such loans are deemed to be too risky”); ALFA
FAQs, supra note 11 (“Pending lawsuits are not assets that banks recognize when determining an individual’s qualification for a loan.”).
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case a cash advance from a litigation finance firm—may be forced to
62
accept an unfair settlement offer or relinquish her claim.
Viewed in this light, litigation finance companies are the white
knights of the tort system, opening up the judicial process to the less
fortunate and even evoking the noble principles of the American legal
63
system, while those who seek to regulate or eliminate the industry
are portrayed as heartlessly pro-big business and unsympathetic to in64
dividual plaintiffs.
Industry proponents argue that, in addition to allowing greater
access to the courts, litigation financing gives plaintiffs increased leverage and bargaining power against typically large, wealthy defendant
65
corporations with seemingly unlimited resources and time.
Since
otherwise, “[a] tort victim aiming at compensation from her tortfeasor
66
is often in a very weak bargaining position,” a litigation finance arrangement that relieves pressure on the plaintiff’s assets provides her
with the ability to credibly threaten litigation and thus, ideally, reach a
67
more favorable result.

62

See, e.g., Libby, supra note 14, at 36 (“[A] plaintiff may feel so financially
strapped by legal expenses along with the costs of dealing with the injury that he or she
is willing to take a smaller amount in settlement rather go through the long wait for a
day in court.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 649 (“[A] wealthy litigant, who can outspend a poorer litigant, is generally at an advantage and may be able to obtain a favorable settlement through attrition.”); George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation
Funding Industry: How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 819
(2001) (“[T]he typical tortfeasor prefers to delay any settlement.”); Swan, supra note
48, at 758 (“Nearly without exception, time favors a defendant. . . . Most plaintiffs settle
because they are unable to wait the nearly two years elapsing before the average case
comes to trial.”).
63
See Carter, supra note 1, at 36 (“‘People who don’t like nonrecourse funding are
really saying they don’t like our legal system. Poor people often have to prematurely
end litigation or settle for less because of the expense.’” (quoting Brooklyn Law School
Professor Anthony J. Sebok)); see also Martin, supra note 3, at 68 (“It would be bad policy and unfair to poor plaintiffs with good cases to regulate litigation financing firms
out of business.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 661 (positing that forbidding litigation
funding would discourage some meritorious suits).
64
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3, at 75 (“Discouraging litigation financing is but
one more example of business defendants’ attempts to ‘reform’ tort law, that is, to rig
the game so that plaintiffs have to forfeit before they have their full and fair day on the
playing field.”).
65
See id. at 77 (describing litigation finance as “leveling the playing field”); Sniegocki, supra note 13, at 29 (describing litigation finance as “bringing the scales of justice into balance”).
66
Swan, supra note 62, at 819.
67
See Dobner, supra note 35, at 1536-37 (summarizing the advantages of wealthier
plaintiffs in the bargaining process).
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Several other themes resonate among supporters of litigation finance. One such theme is that the industry is economically beneficial, since it “supports a tort system that deters negligence and en68
courages a corporate interest in safety” and thus serves the general
69
welfare through its deterrent function. Some supporters liken litigation finance to the widely accepted contingent fee system and reason
70
that it, likewise, should be welcomed into the mainstream. Others
insist that the practice of litigation finance does not constitute predatory lending since a potential client has her attorney to help her un71
derstand any agreement into which she may enter. There are also
litigation finance proponents who defend the industry on freedom of
72
contract grounds, argue that the industry’s legal troubles are caused
73
by a discrete minority and are not widespread, and even submit that
74
the industry is protected by the Constitution. An oft-reported success story of litigation financing is the case of Abner Louima, a Haitian
immigrant who won a widely publicized lawsuit against the New York

68

Martin, supra note 3, at 77.
See Swan, supra note 48, at 783 (arguing that the litigation finance industry “can
fuel deterrence,” which in turn serves the general welfare).
70
See Swan, supra note 62, at 823 (“Boosters of the litigation funding industry posit
that it differs very little from the contingent fee arrangement whereby an attorney files
suit in exchange for a claim against the damage award (or settlement).”); id. at 834
(classifying the contingent fee structure as an “economic precedent” for litigation financing); cf. Moliterno, supra note 5, at 246 (recognizing the positive effects of contingent fees, which align the lawyer’s interests with her client’s, and recommending similarly allowing a lawyer to provide her client with financial assistance). But see Lester
Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 71 (2003) (“[C]ontingent fee lawyers charging standard contingent fees are routinely overcharging some claimants because, in many instances, the
representation involves no meaningful risk of no or low recovery and therefore the
substantial risk premium in these instances yields unearned and unethical windfall
fees . . . .”).
71
See Martin, supra note 3, at 67 (arguing that litigation finance is not predatory in
nature since “the lawyers [that borrowers] already have are going to be involved automatically, and they will have an ethical obligation to provide advice to their clients
about the financing”). But see id. at 68 (“Nevertheless, merely having access to legal
advice does not necessarily protect buyers from litigation financing firms that may be
charging too much.”).
72
See Richmond, supra note 6, at 659 n.68 (“‘The general rule of freedom of contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.’” (quoting Christeson v. Burba, 714
S.W.2d 183, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986))).
73
See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (citing the owner of a litigation firm as insisting
that “the industry’s legal troubles have often been the fault of unscrupulous dealers
and are not inherent to the industry”).
74
See id. at 21 (describing the argument that the First Amendment, in protecting
freedom of association, protects those who want to finance lawsuits).
69

2006]

IT’S ABOUT TIME

517

City Police Department for police brutality, and turned to litigation
75
finance for assistance in paying his living expenses.
B. Critics
Critics of litigation finance, an industry dubbed the “‘Wild West of
76
finance,’” warn of potential ethical violations associated with the
practice. They argue, for example, that litigation finance contracts
can “create confusion concerning the party who actually owns and
controls the lawsuit, and create risks that the attorney-client privilege
77
will be waived unintentionally.” In the first scenario, the plaintiff’s
lawyer may be affected in her judgment by a litigation finance entity
78
attempting to protect its investment. In the second, a litigation finance company seeking information about a plaintiff’s case in order
to decide whether to take her on as a client may obtain such information from the plaintiff’s attorney in a way that violates confidentiality
79
rules or forfeits the attorney-client privilege. Both of these scenarios
invoke the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; an attorney counseling a client who enters into a litigation finance contract must be ex80
tremely vigilant to avoid violating the Rules.
In addition to these
tangible ethical concerns, there is also a general element of suspicion
and skepticism that plagues litigation finance: many courts and prac-

75

See Merrill, supra note 22, at 1 (detailing Louima’s use of litigation financing
while awaiting his settlement). Note, however, that Louima did not obtain any advance until after he had already settled his case; he entered into a litigation finance
arrangement to cover living expenses while waiting to receive his $8.75 million settlement. Id.
76
Martin, supra note 3, at 55 (quoting Michael Pollick, Business & Money: Betting
on the Verdict; Lawyers Advance Plaintiffs Money to Keep Lawsuits Going, in Hopes of Cashing
in If a Suit Succeeds, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at D1).
77
Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
78
See Richmond, supra note 6, at 651-52 (mentioning the potential for manipulation of parties or attorneys by litigation financiers); Swan, supra note 62, at 831-32 (acknowledging the risk that the existence of a litigation finance agreement could potentially compromise an attorney’s independence).
79
But see Richmond, supra note 6, at 652 (“Litigation funding companies do not,
by their ordinary practices, create serious professional responsibility problems for attorneys.”).
80
See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’ L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) (laying out confidentiality
rules); Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 806-09 (discussing how the Model Rules
are implicated in litigation finance scenarios); Richmond, supra note 6, at 669-74
(same). Analogous provisions exist in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
the predecessor to the Model Rules, which is still followed by a small number of states.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF ’ L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983).
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titioners are opposed to the industry due to its perceived unprincipled
81
nature.
A second major criticism of litigation finance is that it wrongfully
takes advantage of consumers. With some contracts calling for annual
82
interest charges as high as 200% of the amount advanced, there is
concern that the victim of an accident will be “further victimized” by a
83
finance company charging such exorbitant rates. While these rates
are frequently justified as appropriate in relation to the high risk of
84
nonrecourse financing, there is disagreement over exactly how much
85
risk is involved. Additionally, since litigation finance does not have
the same structural protections as the prime lending market, which is
heavily regulated and operates in an environment of healthy competition, critics worry that litigation financiers are able to target and swin86
dle vulnerable borrowers.
Critics of litigation finance also express concern that the industry
87
encourages frivolous claims. However, this argument is frequently
rebutted by reasoning that it is in a litigation finance company’s best
interest to advance money only to those plaintiffs who, in its determi81

See Martin, supra note 3, at 63 (describing the “emotional problems faced by the
litigation financing industry,” namely, that “courts just do not like it”); see also Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003) (“[A]
lawsuit is not an investment vehicle.”). But see Dobner, supra note 35, at 1531 (“Litigation is an investment process.”).
82
Carter, supra note 1, at 34; see also Carl Jones, Caveat Plaintiff Panel Says Legislature Should Consider Regulating Litigation Funding Companies, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV.,
Sept. 20, 2005, at 1.
83
Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
84
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
85
See, e.g., Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219 (noting that “the appellants incurred virtually no risk in the transactions”); Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002,
2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (indicating that the case at bar
was a “strict liability labor law case” where there was “low, if any risk”); see also Merrill,
supra note 22, at 1 (describing how a particular litigation finance company “uses strict
underwriting screening rules that ensure only about 4% of the cases it advances money
on are lost in court,” by using a strategy of targeting “cases in the midresolution
stage”).
86
See Liptak, supra note 7 (mentioning the argument that litigation financiers
“exploit vulnerable people”); Martin, supra note 3, at 64 (commenting on the general
lack of predatory lending in the mainstream market); see also Melissa Nann Burke,
Companies That Fund Lawsuits Organize, Set Standards, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Mar.
31, 2005, at 11 (noting that the structure of the litigation finance industry and its lack
of interest rate reporting requirements “makes it difficult for consumers to shop
around”).
87
See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the concern that litigation financiers
“will become Goliaths who can bankroll frivolous lawsuits against more vulnerable defendants”).
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nation, have a reasonable chance of succeeding, since its investment
88
will otherwise be for naught. The “promotes frivolous litigation” argument is further weakened by the fact that litigation finance agreements are entered into after the plaintiff has decided to pursue her
claim and has retained an attorney; as such, litigation finance companies simply become involved with current litigation and do not en89
courage new claims. Furthermore, while it is conceivable that the
mere knowledge that a litigation finance company could potentially
provide funding at a later date may encourage a plaintiff to sue, the
fact remains that the industry receives much of its business through
90
attorney referrals and likely is not recognized enough among the
general public to cause any significant increase in the number of frivolous claims.
A corollary to the “promotes frivolous litigation” criticism of litigation finance stems from the observation that the industry creates an
increase in the amount of litigation overall (whether frivolous or not)
by granting prospective plaintiffs access to the system that they would
not otherwise have had. In doing so, litigation finance may overdeter
risky activities from which the market, and society as a whole, could
91
benefit.
C. Settlement
Both supporters and critics of litigation finance invoke the industry’s effect on the settlement of claims as support for their particular
positions. Indeed, settlement is a vital part of the American justice system, as most disputes that come to the courts are resolved by means
92
other than trial—in fact, less than ten percent of cases are tried.

88

See Martin, supra note 3, at 77 (“No one is going to invest in a frivolous lawsuit
because any money thus invested will be lost.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 660-61
(disputing the concern that litigation financing will result in frivolous litigation by noting the lack of incentive for a company to advance money in an unfounded case).
89
See Carter, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting Cardozo Law School Professor Lester
Brickman as asserting that litigation finance companies “come in after the lawyer, so it
has nothing to do with frivolous litigation”). According to this line of reasoning, litigation finance does not catalyze the origination of claims; however, it conceivably affects
decisions concerning whether or not to continue the claim or accept a settlement. See
infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (outlining the negative effects of litigation
finance arrangements on settlement efforts).
90
ALFA FAQs, supra note 11.
91
See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (recognizing the possibility of overdeterrence).
92
Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:” Judicial Mediation in the
United States, 12 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (1985).
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This proliferation of settlement activity is owed to various factors, including revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly in93
cluding settlement as a purpose of the pretrial conference, judges’
increasing inclination to actively encourage and participate in settlement negotiations, and a recognition of the administrative convenience and arguably superior results achieved by the resolution of
94
claims by settlement. A general rise in alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), of which settlement is a subset, coincides with and is attributed to the high costs of conventional civil litigation and the prolonged uncertainty created by both the wait until trial and the poten95
tially ensuing appellate process, among other factors.
Settlement is preferable for several reasons, both economic and
substantive. Analyzed economically, trials are viewed as failures, since
“[t]he longer play continues, the less the participants’ aggregate
wealth because they must expend on litigation money they could save
96
by settling.”
Encouraging settlement preserves scarce judicial re97
sources for only the most deserving cases. In addition, courts that
promote settlement should be able to allocate resources in such a way
that they can handle a larger number of cases and operate more effi98
ciently.
The costs reduced by settlement are not just monetary,
though; they also include, among others, the emotional cost of stress
related to impending trials and lengthy disputes as well as the opportunity cost of what is forsaken by devoting time to preparing for and
99
attending trial.
93

Id. at 7. Similar rules exist at the state level. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 1210; DEL. SUCT. R. 16; N.Y. R. CT. 202.12 (specifically listing settlement as a matter for consideration at a pretrial conference).
94
See id. Galanter, supra note 92, at 2-3 (discussing various reasons for the increase
in settlement activity).
95
See Erika S. Fine & Elizabeth S. Plapinger, ADR Overview, in CONTAINING LEGAL
COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 7, 7
(Erika S. Fine ed., 1988) (explaining the reasons for the growth of ADR).
96
Samuel Issacharoff et al., Bargaining Impediments and Settlement Behavior, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 51-52 (David A. Anderson ed.,
1996) (citations omitted); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and
the Trial/Settlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 17, 17 (“Economic models of litigation often view trial as a costly failure to achieve a mutually beneficial settlement.”).
97
See Galanter, supra note 92, at 2 (describing justifications for settlement).
98
See id. at 8 (presenting the prosettlement argument that “courts that promote
settlements will as a result handle more cases”).
99
See WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 2-3 (1988) (enumerating the various costs lessened by settlement).
PER.
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In substantive terms, settlement is advocated as a “higher quality
100
of justice” with increased fulfillment enjoyed among participants.
Because of the unavoidable uncertainty of a jury trial, the resulting
101
verdict may be universally regarded as inappropriate.
Settlement,
however, offers the opportunity to customize case resolution to the
participants’ various needs, and may therefore result in “greater party
satisfaction and enforcement reliability” due to its collaborative,
102
rather than winner-take-all, nature.
Furthermore, settlements involving active participation by judges may be even more successful
103
than those without such participation.
The view that settlement is preferable to trial, however, is certainly
not unanimous. On one hand, trials are beneficial because they edu104
cate the public, and the shift to the largely private process of settlement dampens public debate and decreases the general public’s ac105
cess to the legal system.
Additionally, the focus on settlement as a
way to maximize efficiency in the courts may come at the steep price
106
of equal justice.
In spite of these concerns, however, settlement is
embraced by the modern civil court system due to its optimization of
economic efficiency and, arguably, of substantive results, and is thus
often encouraged as a preferred alternative to trial.

100

Galanter, supra note 92, at 3 (quoting an outline distributed to new federal
judges at a training session, as explaining that “‘[i]n most controversies, most court
cases, the highest quality of justice is not the all or nothing, black or white end result of
a trial but is in the grey area—in most cases a freely negotiated settlement is a higher
quality of justice’”).
101
See id. at 2 (“[A] trial might lead to results that are unacceptably harsh or calamitous . . . .”).
102
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985).
103
See Galanter, supra note 92, at 8 (setting forth the argument that “judicial promotion of settlements will result in outcomes that are superior to those that would occur in its absence,” but noting that additional empirical evidence is needed to support
this claim).
104
See Issacharoff et al., supra note 96, at 68 (discussing, as a benefit of trial and
thus a drawback of settlement, the fact that trials “can be a source of education and
information about law to the public” and “can provide an opportunity to vindicate
public goals”).
105
See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 999-1000 (lamenting the increase in settlement and
its negative effect on public involvement in and connection with the judicial process).
106
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075-76 (1984) (describing the potential of settlement to be coercive, especially when the parties are of disparate wealth).
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Litigation finance is regarded by many as an obstacle to settlement. A rational plaintiff will not settle for any amount offered by the
defendant that is less than the aggregate of the principal amount advanced to her and the current interest accrued, which is often immense due to the staggering rates charged by many litigation finance
107
companies.
This artificially inflated minimum acceptable offer and
the nonrecourse character of the arrangement will lead the rational
plaintiff to reject otherwise reasonable settlement offers, since, if she
108
loses at trial, she will owe nothing.
In this way, litigation finance
gives plaintiffs disincentives to settle and instead encourages disputes
109
to progress to trial.
An opposing view posits that litigation financing actually encour110
ages settlement, or at least more just settlement. Since entering into
a litigation finance contract presumably gives the plaintiff the resources and “threat credibility” to carry her claim to trial, litigation financing may draw an otherwise obstinate defendant to the bargaining
111
table and result in a fairer settlement award.
Additionally, the interest on the advance, which accrues while the case is pending, creates
an added incentive for the plaintiff to settle (and to do so as soon as

107

See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220-21
(Ohio 2003) (providing an example of how a plaintiff’s settlement options were affected by her litigation finance arrangement).
108
See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (“[A] plaintiff bankrolled by a lender has an incentive to reject modest, but reasonable, settlement offers. At worst, she risks a total
loss in the courts, in which case she owes nothing and can even keep the amount advanced.”).
109
See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221 (listing its impediment of settlement as a reason for declaring a litigation finance contract void as champerty); Swan, supra note 48,
at 779 (presenting the view that the nonrecourse nature of litigation financing provides plaintiffs an incentive to go to trial, because “[i]f they settle most of the money
will go to their lawyers and the litigation funding companies” (quotation marks omitted)). ALFA notes that its members have agreed to fund at most ten percent of the
estimated net value of any case so as not to “disincentivize the client from settling the
case.” ALFA FAQs, supra note 11.
110
See Richmond, supra note 6, at 661 (“The law favors fair and just settlements,
not unfair or unjust settlements brought about by a party’s economic desperation . . . .”).
111
See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 811 (positing that litigation financing
gives a plaintiff “threat credibility,” in that a defendant cannot ignore the threat of litigation by a plaintiff with sufficient resources to litigate); Richmond, supra note 6, at
661 (noting that litigation finance “may even promote settlement . . . by forcing a recalcitrant defendant to approach a case reasonably and pragmatically in light of the
fact that its adversary has the resources to meaningfully prosecute the matter”).
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possible) so as to avoid accumulating continuously higher debts.
Finally, an advance that lessens the pressure on the plaintiff to meet
her immediate financial commitments likewise reduces the temporal
burden on her attorney, who will have more time to prepare the case
113
and negotiate the most favorable settlement offer possible.
Despite
these arguments advanced by those who believe litigation finance encourages settlement, the reality nonetheless remains that a plaintiff
who owes a consequential debt (which may be significantly higher
than the objective value of her claim) will not be inclined to accept a
settlement offer lower than such an amount.
After considering both sides of the debate, it is clear that while
litigation finance satisfies a heretofore unfulfilled need by giving
plaintiffs the resources necessary to pursue their claims and increase
their bargaining power, some measure of reform that ensures consumer protection and the effectiveness of the settlement process must
be instituted to prevent the industry from flourishing at the high cost
114
of equity.
The principles of systems thinking, set forth below, offer
unique insight into how such reform might best be framed.
III. SYSTEMS THINKING
A. Systems Thinking Explained
Systems thinking is an amalgam of a discipline loosely defined as
the study of “how a number of different things act together when ex-

112

See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“[T]he interest on the advance, obviously of sizeable nature . . . creates an added incentive to settle . . . .”).
113
See Sniegocki, supra note 13, at 29-30 (“[A] cash advance . . . allows [the plaintiff’s] attorney time to prepare the case and negotiate a just and adequate settlement.”).
114
As Susan Lorde Martin notes:
There is little doubt that a litigation financing industry that acts professionally
and ethically in attempting to earn a reasonable return for the risk it is undertaking, fills a need that has not been served by more traditional lenders. The
industry can be improved by some regulation, but it would be unfortunate if
the entire industry became the victim of a political movement of so-called tort
reform that dwells on the outlier cases in which plaintiffs receive unwarranted
windfalls but ignores the much more numerous situations where fairness and
justice are absent because meritorious plaintiffs do not have the funds to sustain routine expenses as well as medical costs during the years that it may take
to bring their cases to a final conclusion.
Martin, supra note 3, at 74.
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posed to a number of different influences at the same time” and
colloquially explained by the maxim “the whole is more than the sum
116
of its parts.”
It gained popularity among mainstream academics in
the 1970s and 80s, although a survey of history shows its presence
117
much earlier in time.
Systems thinking has its roots amidst a modern scientific revolution, in which the Newtonian, mechanistic view of
the world as “an exquisitely designed giant mechanism” divisible into
discrete parts gave way to a “science of organized complexity,” with
the so-called “new scientist” focusing on “relationships and situations”
118
rather than on “atomistic facts and events.”
As such, the systems
view treats things as “integrated wholes of their subsidiary components
and never as the mechanistic aggregate of parts in isolable causal rela119
tions.”

115

ERVIN LASZLO, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF THE WORLD 5 (1972). This Comment
seeks to apply theoretically the general, overarching principles of systems thinking to
the field of litigation finance; it does not attempt to engage in detailed empirical
analysis or modeling.
116
NIC J.T.A. KRAMER & JACOB DE SMIT, SYSTEMS THINKING: CONCEPTS AND NOTIONS 3 (H.E. Stenfert Kroese B.V. trans., 1977); see also PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH
DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 68 (1990) (describing systems thinking as “a discipline for seeing wholes . . . a framework for seeing
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static
‘snapshots’”).
117
See JAMES E. HERGET, CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 73 (1996)
(citing historical examples of systems thinking, including “Adam Smith’s eighteenthcentury view of the economy” in which “individual human beings separately pursuing
their personal economic goals . . . gave rise to a ‘system’ in which the distribution of
goods and services was arranged for everyone’s benefit”).
118
LASZLO, supra note 115, at 11-13; see id. at 3 (“Until very recently, contemporary
Western science was shaped by a mode of thinking which placed rigorous detailed
knowledge above all other considerations.”); MARGARET J. WHEATLEY, LEADERSHIP AND
THE NEW SCIENCE: LEARNING ABOUT ORGANIZATION FROM AN ORDERLY UNIVERSE 9
(1992) (“The Newtonian model of the world is characterized by . . . a focus on things
rather than relationships . . . . In new science, the underlying currents are a movement
toward holism, toward understanding the system as a system and giving primary value
to the relationships that exist among seemingly discrete parts.”). For a general account of changes in scientific thought throughout history, see PETER CHECKLAND, SYSTEMS THINKING, SYSTEMS PRACTICE 36-50 (1981).
119
LASZLO, supra note 115, at 14-15. The systems literature often illustrates its holistic orientation by pointing to the human body as an example:
Living systems are organized in such a way that they form multi-leveled structures, each level consisting of subsystems which are wholes in regard to their
parts, and parts with respect to the larger wholes. Thus molecules combine to
form organelles, which in turn combine to form cells. The cells form tissues
and organs, which themselves form larger systems, like the digestive system or
the nervous system. These, finally, combine to form the living woman or
man . . . . People form families, tribes, societies, nations.
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A radical departure from the way most of us approach the
120
world, systems thinking encourages a new way of analyzing problems; in fact, it even suggests a new way of determining what is (or is
121
122
not) a problem in the first place.
This paradigm shift entails various overarching principles of how to conduct analysis as a systems
thinker, in particular approaching problems as subsets of their larger
environments rather than in isolation; rejecting a linear, “either-or”
view of the world, instead recognizing its inevitable complexity and in123
terrelation;
and acknowledging that seemingly small events or
124
changes can cause extreme outcomes.
Systems thinking has been applied to many disciplines, enjoying
especially warm reception in management scholarship, where systems
thinkers have recommended that businesses adopt a fluid leadership
structure instead of adhering to traditional models of hierarchical
125
management.
Other applications in the management context have
emphasized the importance of embracing the inevitability and positivity of change, including all stakeholders in management and decisionmaking processes, creating working groups and networks instead of
126
formalized standing committees, and balancing work with family

FRITJOF CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE RISING CULTURE 43
(1982).
120
See SENGE, supra note 116, at 3 (“From a very early age, we are taught to break
apart problems, to fragment the world.”).
121
See, e.g., WHEATLEY, supra note 118, at 20-21 (observing that “disorder can be a
source of order,” and that “if we look at [a chaotic] system long enough and with the
perspective of time, it always demonstrates its inherent orderliness”).
122
See T. IRENE SANDERS, STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE NEW SCIENCE: PLANNING
IN THE MIDST OF CHAOS, COMPLEXITY, AND CHANGE 144-46 (1998) (citing examples of
paradigm shifts and explaining that a paradigm shift “proposes new questions, redefines old questions, and opens the door for further exploration, discovery, and experimentation”).
123
See id. at 65 (noting that “most of the world is made up of nonlinear systems”); id. at
147 (advocating a shift from linear to nonlinear, from separateness to relatedness).
124
See id. at 57-61 (describing the “Butterfly Effect,” in which a butterfly flapping
its wings in Asia causes a hurricane in the Atlantic, as a metaphor for how “small
changes or events create complex results”); SENGE, supra note 116, at 64 (“[S]mall,
well-focused actions can sometimes produce significant, enduring improvements . . . .”).
125
See, e.g., WHEATLEY, supra note 118, at 22-23 (describing informal leadership
and its responsiveness to change, and stating that “[i]f organizations are machines,
control makes sense [and i]f organizations are process structures, then seeking to impose control through permanent structure is suicide”).
126
See SANDERS, supra note 122, at 136, 147-50 (listing systems thinking’s applications to business management).
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127

life.
Systems thinking in one form or another has also been used to
128
analyze foreign policy initiatives, the public’s concern with current
129
130
events, and negotiation techniques.
Despite such developments in other disciplines, the application of
131
systems thinking to law has been comparatively limited.
Niklas
Luhmann, a German scholar who has done much of the theoretical
systems analysis in the field, defines law as “a social system of commu132
nication that serves to secure normative expectations.”
The law is
an “autopoietic,” or self-maintaining and self-renewing, system because “[l]aw comes out of law” and “absorbs change” “as the system
receives stimuli from its environment and as the law reflects upon it133
self.”
Thus, viewed systemically, the law is a living, breathing organism constantly in flux.
Because of the realistic view it counsels of the legal system as a
complex and ever-changing entity (particularly when performing its
134
conflict resolution function ), systems thinking is a useful way to analyze litigation finance and to approach the decision that courts and
state legislatures now face concerning whether the industry should be

127

See SENGE, supra note 116, at 307 (“Traditional organizations undeniably foster
conflict between work and family . . . the artificial boundary between work and family
is anathema to systems thinking.”).
128
See, e.g., id. at 59 (noting the failure of certain food assistance programs in developing countries because of compensating feedback, whereby the aid, albeit wellintentioned, has systemic effects resulting in a worsening of the problem).
129
See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 122, at 75 (describing “strange attractors,” or
events that “quickly give visibility to unrecognized initial conditions,” such as the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings shedding light on sexual harassment and the O.J.
Simpson trial creating public concern about the role of wealth in judicial proceedings).
130
See, e.g., PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE: DEVELOPING MORAL COURAGE IN RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS 178-81 (2d ed. 2002) (advocating
a paradigm shift in the approach to negotiations involving unequal bargaining power).
131
For examples of how systems thinking has been used in legal scholarship, see
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1091 (2005) (applying systems thinking to complex contractual transactions); Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36
HOUS. L. REV. 1609, 1637 (1999) (relating systems thinking to health care law).
132
HERGET, supra note 117, at 75.
133
Id. at 77-78.
134
On the complex, systemic nature of conflict resolution, see Issacharoff et al.,
supra note 96, at 72 (“There are inherent difficulties in the resolution of conflict in a
world of complicated interactions, counterposing interests, and fragmented control of
decisions. That is the world we live in, a world in which intricate social, commercial,
and legal relations undergird everyday conduct and influence the conduct of many
disputes.”).
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“left alone, regulated to some extent, or regulated out of business.”
Many of the proposals seeking to reform litigation finance advanced
thus far have involved narrowly targeted, mechanistic changes to the
law that, standing alone, do not account for their potential effects on
the legal system and society as a whole or address anything more than
136
the surface of litigation finance’s negative effects.
A systems thinking analysis, in contrast, suggests the implementation of highly lever137
aged change that would shift the very position litigation finance occupies in the civil justice arena.
B. Proposal: Reduce Time Delay
Taking into account the principles of systems thinking, reducing
the time between when a claim originates and when it is resolved is an
advantageous way to address the consumer protection and settlement138
obstruction concerns about litigation finance without overregulating the industry and thus depriving a sector of the American public of
139
court access or the opportunity for elevated bargaining power. With
140
delays in the civil justice system omnipresent, and often favoring the
141
usually wealthier defendant, a reduction in time delay would address the underlying issues that induce a plaintiff to enter a litigation
finance contract in the first place. When such a contract is formed, a
shorter period until disposition of the claim would reduce the amount
of time that interest accrues and any accompanying disincentive to
settle. This solution nonetheless allows the industry to enjoy continuity of existence without heavy-handed interference.

135

Martin, supra note 3, at 56.
See infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text (listing proposals).
137
See SENGE, supra note 116, at 114 (defining the principle of leverage as making
changes consistent with the “economy of means” that “lead to significant, enduring
improvements”).
138
See supra Parts II.B.-C (detailing concerns of industry critics).
139
See supra Part II.A (describing the positive effects of litigation finance).
140
See ABA DIV. FOR JUDICIAL SERVS., DEFEATING DELAY: DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A COURT DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAM 6-7 (1986) [hereinafter DEFEATING
DELAY] (“In most jurisdictions, delay . . . is the norm.”); Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?:
An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814-15
(2000) (discussing the length of time for civil cases to reach disposition by trial, and
noting that the Sixth Amendment right to a “speedy trial” applies only to criminal
cases).
141
See supra note 62 and accompanying text (comparing the typical financial positions of plaintiffs and defendants).
136
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Delay is an element indigenous to many systems, and one that can
have significant implications unless recognized and accounted for.
Consider the widespread existence of delay in daily personal and
business situations: the time between eating a meal and feeling full,
adjusting the shower faucet and sensing the change in temperature,
and ordering new inventory and having it on hand to sell to custom142
ers. An especially enlightening exercise, frequently used in business
classes, requires participants to simulate managing inventory through
a supply chain. 143 Participants are organized into teams of four, with
one person each representing the factory, distributor, wholesaler, and
retailer; consumer demand is determined at random by a deck of
144
cards.
Because most do not understand the effects of the time delays inherent to the process or the effects of fluctuating demand on
the entirety of the supply chain, the hypothetical average costs among
145
first-time participants are ten times greater than optimal.
In the litigation context, delay is not only of practical concern, as
it results in a decrease in evidentiary quality and witness availability,
but also of social concern, as it is cost prohibitive and threatens the
146
credibility of the justice system. It is thus evident that time delay can
introduce problems into the systems it pervades, and accordingly,
“‘[o]ne of the highest leverage points for improving system perform142

See SENGE, supra note 116, at 89-92 (providing examples of time delay).
See e.g., JOHN D. STERMAN, BUSINESS DYNAMICS: SYSTEMS THINKING AND MODELING FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 684-94 (2000) (describing the “Beer Distribution Game”
and its illustration of how delay creates inefficient, choleric systems characterized by
severe oscillation—in this case, extremely large orders of inventory during periods of
high demand followed by orders of zero once participants realize they are overstocked).
144
Id. at 684.
145
Id. at 686.
146
As Michael Heise notes:
Prolonged case disposition time frequently correlates with an increase in litigation costs and threatens evidentiary quality as memories fade, evidence
spoils, and witnesses and litigants die. Delays in the resolution of civil disputes
erode public confidence in the civil justice system, disappoint and frustrate
those seeking compensation through the legal system, and generate benefits
for those with the financial ability to withstand delays or otherwise benefit
from them. Such factors, individually and collectively, undermine public faith
and confidence in the ability of our civil justice system to operate efficiently
and, more importantly, equitably.
Heise, supra note 140, at 814-15. Note also the effects of delay on the amount at stake.
Any amount expected to be received in the future must be discounted to its present
value, which will be substantially less. See generally George Priest, The Simple Economics of
Civil Procedure, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 392-93 (2000) (explaining the impact of
delay on financial awards).
143

2006]

529

IT’S ABOUT TIME
147

ance . . . is the minimization of system delays.’”
Viewing reduction
in delay as a manifestation of the leverage principle, which counsels
that “the best results come not from large-scale efforts but from small
148
well-focused actions,” suggests that reducing the time that a civil
claim is pending is a less intrusive and more promising alternative to
other possible litigation finance reforms.
Faster disposition of claims would reduce the gap between a plaintiff’s assets and her financial needs, since as each month arrives, so do
another rent or mortgage payment and slew of additional bills. Resolving claims more quickly would alter the way the system works by
reducing the pressure on plaintiffs to continuously muster additional
resources in order to see their claims through to completion. In this
way, plaintiffs would have to turn to litigation financiers less often and
for smaller amounts.
A reduction in time delay would also address the concerns of
those stakeholders who emphatically support the litigation finance industry for providing a necessary service to people who might otherwise
149
not be able to pursue justice, in addition to addressing the concerns
150
of those who advocate a free-market approach to legal claims.
As a
practical matter, no reduction in delay could completely eliminate the
disparity between every plaintiff’s resources and needs; there will always be certain plaintiffs who simply cannot stretch their limited
means over the length of their litigation. However, a briefer disposition time would confine the litigation finance industry to the clients
who most need its services and thus mitigate its impact on the civil
litigation process. By allowing the industry to survive and instead adjusting the larger environment within which it operates, the proposed
151
approach would preserve the benefits of litigation finance.
When a plaintiff does employ the services of a litigation financier, a
reduction in time delay would likewise reduce her aggregate amount
owed, as there would be a generally smaller amount borrowed as well

147

SENGE, supra note 116, at 89 (quoting Ray Stata, CEO of Analog Devices).
Id. at 114.
149
See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (advancing the argument that litigation finance increases court access).
150
See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform,
12 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 443 (advocating a “market for the sale and exchange of tort
claims”); Swan, supra note 62, at 817 (“Competitive exchange affords a promising remedy for inefficient tort laws.”).
151
See Martin, supra note 3, at 68 (“It would be bad policy and unfair to poor
plaintiffs with good cases to regulate litigation financing firms out of business.”).
148
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as less time for interest to accumulate and compound. A faster disposition thereby should appease, at least to some extent, consumer protection advocates who condemn the usually extreme differential between the amount a plaintiff receives as an advance and the amount
152
she owes following resolution of her claim.
The existence of a nonrecourse litigation financing arrangement
has serious implications for the settlement process, often causing
plaintiffs to refuse to settle for an objectively reasonable amount and
thus forcing an inflated number of cases to trial. As discussed above,
153
this results in increased costs and inefficiencies in the court system.
A reduction in disposition time would lessen, or perhaps even eliminate, the impediments to settlement, since interest would not have as
much time to accrue, and the plaintiff would thus owe a more reasonable total amount. The simultaneous reduction in accumulation of
living expenses would address the problem of a plaintiff feeling compelled to accept an unreasonably low settlement offer just to make
154
ends meet.
In an archetypal example of systemic interrelation, just
as a reduction in time delay encourages settlement, settlement in turn
155
results in quicker disposition of cases.
There are numerous ways a reduction in time delay could be im156
plemented in the civil court system. Process-oriented changes, such
157
as the institution of efficient caseflow-management systems, firm en158
forcement of scheduling policies, and a flexible allowance for the
159
incorporation of additional adjudicators are practical ways to lessen
the burden of delay on the courts. More drastically, some have advocated a shift from the traditional civil jury trial paradigm to increased
reliance on other methods of case disposition, including more fre-

152

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (detailing consumer protection
concerns).
153
See supra Part II.C (indicating how settlement is affected by nonrecourse arrangements).
154
See supra note 62 and accompanying text (identifying financial pressures on
plaintiffs).
155
See Heise, supra note 140, at 816.
156
See id. at 816 (characterizing particular delay-reduction techniques as “processoriented” rather than structural).
157
See DEFEATING DELAY, supra note 140, at 42 (discussing various permutations of
case assignment systems designed to reduce delays).
158
See id. at 43 (explaining administrative approaches to delay reduction, such as
firm-continuance policies and date-certain scheduling).
159
See id. at 43-44 (recommending the use of retired and visiting judges, when
necessary, to relieve court congestion).
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quent use of bench trials and the “short trial.”
In addition to the
reduction in time delay that bench trials offer due to their exclusion
of potentially lengthy undertakings such as jury selection, an increase
in bench trials is positively correlated with increased settlement rates,
and, “[t]ypically, case disposition times for cases that settle are less
162
than that for those cases that reach full trial.”
Admittedly, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in federal court and corresponding rights at the state level limit the feasibility of drastically increasing
bench trials. However, the suggestion nonetheless remains as a potential step toward reducing time delay in the court system in certain
cases.
Another innovative time-saving technique is the experimental use
163
of “short trials,” one-day trials decided by a four-person jury.
Jurors
are given a notebook containing the evidence relevant to their case;
164
they then have the opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses.
Three of the four jury members must agree on the verdict, which is
165
binding.
Many of these delay-reduction approaches, which can conceivably
be varied and expanded upon in any number of ways, have been implemented with success in certain state court systems. For example,
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas has garnered accolades for
166
recent changes that have increased efficiency and reduced delay
and that provide a potential model for other courts to follow. In
1992, there was a backlog of over 28,000 civil cases in the Court of
Common Pleas; now, ninety percent of lawsuits are cleared in two
167
years or less.
The changes instrumental in bringing about such
160

See Heise, supra note 140, at 815 (setting forth a delay-reduction strategy of increased reliance on bench trials).
161
G. Thomas Munsterman, A Cost Free Civil Jury Trial?, 18 CT. MANAGER 35, 35-36
(2003).
162
Heise, supra note 140, at 816. But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124,
1173-74 (1992) (noting the existence of selection bias between judge and jury trials).
163
See Munsterman, supra note 161, at 35-36.
164
Id.
165
Id. The short trial has been particularly popular in Maricopa County, Arizona
and Clark County, Nevada. Id.
166
See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROGRAMS IN THE PHILADELPHIA
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FINAL REPORT 58 (Sept. 2004) (describing the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas as “arguably the best-managed large urban civil trial court operation in the nation”); L. Stuart Ditzen, Civil Courts in City Hailed as a Model, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 27, 2004, at A1 (summarizing changes in the Philadelphia courts).
167
Ditzen, supra note 166, at A1.
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radical improvement include the institution of a commerce court to
specialize in disputes among businesses and a complex litigation cen168
ter to handle mass tort cases; the placement of all incoming cases on
case-management tracks with strict deadlines; and the creation of a
“Day Backward” and a “Day Forward” program whereby judges are assigned to teams organized by case year, with each team led by a “team
169
leader.”
These changes have been met with praise not only from
outside analysts, but also from trial lawyers, who appreciate the certainty accorded by “the firmness of trial dates . . . and the quick dispo170
sition of cases.”
Similarly, initiatives undertaken by the Los Angeles Superior
Court aimed at minimizing delays have resulted in a reduction of the
four- or five-year time lapse until trial prevalent in the 1980s and early
1990s to a system where, as of 2002, ninety percent of cases were resolved within one year and ninety-eight percent were resolved within
171
eighteen months.
Such drastic improvement was attained through
the implementation of a flexible “Fast Track” program, improvements
in pretrial procedures, increased use of technological resources such
as electronic filing, and procedural unification efforts that simplified
172
and standardized court rules.
While there are obviously a great number of practical manifestations of the time-delay-reduction principle and virtually endless permutations of reform initiatives, certain elements are prerequisites for
the success of any such effort. Thorough statistical analysis should be
undertaken prior to the institution of any modifications to the current
system to identify the nature, extent, and causes of the existing de173
lay.
Implementation of effective and sustainable delay-reduction
techniques also requires the support and education of all relevant
174
constituencies, particularly judges, “who must be the formal leaders

168

Id.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 166, at 17-20. The “Day Backward”
program was instituted to systematically address backlogged cases while the “Day Forward” program was created to schedule currently incoming cases for prompt trials. Id.
170
Id. at 24.
171
Robert H. O’Brien, The Success of Delay Reduction in the Civil Trial Courts, 25 L.A.
LAW., Mar. 2002, at 64.
172
Id. at 64-66.
173
See, e.g., DEFEATING DELAY, supra note 140, at 14-18 (emphasizing the importance of data collection and analysis).
174
See id. at 66-68 (discussing the necessity of involving as many participants as
possible and educating them about the goals and operation of any changes).
169
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175

of the reform effort.” Finally, “[i]n choosing the change tactics, the
176
team must understand the nature of the system.”
Keeping the systemic effects of any proposed reforms at the forefront of the discussion would ensure that improvements do not result in unintended
consequences that exacerbate the problem they are intended to ame177
liorate.
This includes recognizing when the expedited disposition
of a case is not appropriate. Whether due to injuries sustained by the
plaintiff that need time to stabilize or discovery-related time requirements, there are certainly instances when delay is necessary and even
178
desirable.
Therefore, a successful delay-reducing initiative must include a screening mechanism for the “identification of those cases
179
that need special handling.”
A minimization of case disposition time alone would not achieve
perfect equilibrium between the litigation finance industry’s strengths
and weaknesses. Other proposals for improving the litigation finance
industry include such diverse ideas as forming a state-run public auction market for champerty, in which litigation finance companies bid
on claims and the defendant retains the right to match the highest
180
181
bid; applying truth-in-lending requirements to the industry; creat182
ing a competitive exchange market for tort claims; allowing attor183
neys to invest in their clients’ suits;
and instituting consumer175

Id. at 8; see also id. at 40 (“The most important concept for delay reduction is
the acceptance by the court, rather than the lawyers or the litigants, of the responsibility
for the pace of litigation.” (emphasis added)); id. at 41 (“[T]he techniques designed
must make the most efficient use of the scarcest resource of the court system, the
judge’s time.”).
176
Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
177
Failing to take a systems view may cause unintended results. For example, cigarettes with lower nicotine content actually increase the intake of carcinogens “as smokers compensate for the low nicotine content by smoking more cigarettes per day.”
STERMAN, supra note 143, at 9. Other examples include certain antibiotics, which have
the unintended effect of stimulating “drug-resistant pathogens” and antilock brakes,
which “cause some people to drive more aggressively, offsetting some of their benefits.” Id.
178
See Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal: Understanding the Importance of
Avoiding Unnecessary Delay in the Resolution of Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 880,
895-96 (2000) (identifying situations where delay is appropriate).
179
O’Brien, supra note 171, at 65.
180
See Bond, supra note 34, at 1320-22 (setting forth his proposed system of “public
champerty”).
181
See Martin, supra note 3, at 68-69 (suggesting that the Truth in Lending Act be
amended to include litigation finance).
182
See Swan, supra note 62, at 817 (advocating a free market for legal claims).
183
See Moliterno, supra note 5, at 256-57 (proposing changes to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
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friendly policies such as a rescission period and a notarization requirement to ensure that a plaintiff’s attorney reviews any litigation
184
finance agreement.
While each of these proposals may very well
prove useful to regulate litigation finance, without confronting the
broader reality of a civil court system leaden with backlog, none will
lead to sustainable success for either the litigation finance industry or
the people it purports to serve.
If implemented in isolation, these proposals, by virtue of their
failure to take a systems approach, would be left vulnerable to a multitude of problems. One likely pitfall is the systemic phenomenon of
185
unintended consequences and burden shifting, in which supposed
solutions simply transfer a problem to another area rather than truly
eradicating it. Others include “compensating feedback,” which occurs
when “well-intentioned interventions call forth responses from the sys186
187
tem that offset the benefits;” the “easy way out” leading back in;
and the “cure [proving] worse than the disease,” when “short-term
188
improvements lead[] to long-term dependency.”
The usefulness of
systems analysis and the delay reduction it counsels lie in the awareness of and preparation for these possibilities that it affords.
When combined with other potential changes to the litigation finance industry (such as those mentioned above), a time delay reduction would address the root, rather than merely the symptoms, of the
problems a plaintiff seeking justice faces. Due to their cognizance of
the systemic nature of the civil justice process, efforts to decrease dis189
position time thus would set the stage for sustainable reform.

184

See Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regulatory Framework to Legitimize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
347, 353 (2004) (laying out suggested reforms); Press Release, supra note 19 (publicizing consumer-friendly changes agreed to by certain litigation finance companies).
185
See SENGE, supra note 116, at 57 (“Today’s problems come from yesterday’s ‘solutions.’”); supra note 177 and accompanying text (providing examples of unintended
side effects). This principle leaves linear thinkers intent on reform with a choice between Scylla and Charybdis, as the avoidance of one problem simply creates another,
potentially worse, one.
186
SENGE, supra note 116, at 58 (“[T]he harder you push, the harder the system
pushes back; the more effort you expend trying to improve matters, the more effort
seems to be required.”).
187
Id. at 60-61 (acknowledging that while it is comforting to apply “familiar solutions,” they often result in aggravation of the underlying problem).
188
Id. at 61.
189
Id. at 62 (“[A]ny long-term solution must . . . strengthen the ability of the system to shoulder its own burdens.”).
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CONCLUSION
An efficacious long-term approach to litigation finance must ensure that consumers are protected and remove obstacles to settlement
while still permitting the industry to fulfill its role in the marketplace
of providing a necessary financial service. Although there are several
existing legal doctrines—such as champerty, usury, and contract principles—that could potentially be used or modified to regulate litigation finance, as well as a multitude of other proposals for addressing
the industry’s shortcomings, no reform is likely to be successful unless
accompanied by a decrease in the disposition time for civil claims. A
reduction in time delay would make the civil court system drastically
more efficient and would provide a holistic measure of required control over the litigation finance industry.

